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PLEDGING FAITH IN THE CIVIL RELIGION;
OR, WOULD YOU SIGN THE CONSTITUTION?
SANFORD LEVINSON*

I. INTRODUCTION

A.

"Miracle at Philadelphia"

The principal exhibit commemorating the bicentennial of the
Constitution is located in Philadelphia, in the Second Bank of the
United States. Called "Miracle at Philadelphia," it is designed not
only to inform, but also, inevitably, to establish a mood suitable to
contact with the miraculous. One suspects, for example, that the
letters from George Washington and the original notebook of
James Madison function for most viewers as sacred relics rather
than as sources of information.1
As the exhibit reaches the culminating event of September 17,
viewers are presented with an invitation to become a latter-day
* Charles Tilford McCormick Professor of Law, University of Texas Law School; Member, Institute for Advanced Study, 1986-1987. A.B., Duke University, 1962; Ph.D., Harvard
University, 1969; J.D., Stanford University, 1973.
As always, I am grateful to a number of friends and colleagues who were willing to respond to various drafts of this talk prior to its delivery on March 28, 1987. They include
Douglas Laycock and Lucas Powe of the University of Texas Law School, Gene Nichol of
William and Mary Law School, and Richard Rabinowitz, the designer of "Miracle at Philadelphia." I also received valuable encouragement from Clifford Geertz and Joan Scott of the
Institute for Advanced Study, within whose environment I was privileged to be able to think
about and draft this article. What is printed here was submitted to the participants at the
Fourth Annual Bill of Rights Symposium in late February and left unchanged thereafter. A
revised and substantially shorter version will appear as the concluding chapter of my book
Constitutional Faith, which will be published by the Princeton University Press in the
spring of 1988. The discussion of the Schneiderman case in Part III below, moreover, will
appear in greatly expanded form as Chapter Four of that book.
1. Indeed, Madison's notebook can hardly be anything else than a relic, since the display
has no standard "informational" content, as contrasted to the Washington letters, which
allow the reader to become truly engaged in the question of Washington's willingness to
accept the entreaties of Henry Knox and others to lend his unique prestige to the Philadelphia Convention by agreeing to attend it.
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signatory of the Constitution.2 The exhibit in fact takes ample note
of the controversy surrounding both the signing and the subsequent ratification. Yet it is hard to believe that most viewers will
not interpret the invitation as a suggested transformation of the
visit from a mere remembrance of times past to a renewed dedication to the Constitution-a continuing ordination of it, as it
were-as an ever-living presence that is vital to the establishment
of a more perfect Union committed above all to the realization of
justice and the blessings of liberty Every participant in the exhibit
is thus asked to make a choice-to sign or not to sign, to ratify or
to reject, the Constitution of the United States.
I have now visited the exhibit twice, and I commend it to all who
have not yet seen it. I have not yet accepted the invitation to sign,
however, and I want to devote my remarks not only to explaining
my own indecision about signing-for that is probably a better
term, at least so far, than "decision not to sign"-but also to indicating why I believe that the question is of some general import
and worth our collective attention.

2. In particular, visitors are confronted with two endless scrolls, each with the same two
questions: "Will you sign the Constitution? If you had been in Independence Hall on September 17, 1787, would you have endorsed the Constitution?"
Other celebrants have issued similar invitations. After completing the above remarks, I
received a flyer distributed by the National Conference of Christians and Jews. At the top of
the flyer is a statement by Mark H. Curtis, President of the Association of American Colleges in 1984: "If it were possible, it would be more than symbolic to have all persons sign a
document of ratification to signify that they understand the principles of the Constitution
and accept the rights and responsibilities it bestows upon them." Immediately underneath
the statement is a depiction of the 1787 Constitution, including the names of the signers.
Below this is a large printed statement: "This is my Constitution; I'm putting my name on
the line," followed in turn by blank lines that can be inscribed by those willing to do so. A
note at the bottom indicates that the project is "officially recognized by the commission on
the bicentennial of the United States Constitution."
I also attended a bicentennial symposium at Hofstra University, one of whose "special
events" was an exhibit, sponsored by Nassau County (New York) and the Bar Association of
Nassau County, entitled "The Living Constitution." According to the program description:
Three hundred people (100 each day) will have the opportunity to sign a word
to parchment sheets cut to the same dimensions as the original Constitution,
thereby creating a "Living" United States Constitution. Each signer will receive a memorial certificate. The completed "Living Constitution" will become
a permanent part of a memorial of the Bicentennial-Constitution wall in the
main lobby of the Supreme Court Building in Mineola, Long Island.
One wonders what feelings were supposed to run through the minds of those who got to
copy the words of article IV, section 2, clause 3-the Fugitive Slave Clause.
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B. ConstitutionalFaith
I have been writing now for some years about constitutionalism-and constitutional faith-as a central aspect of American
civil religion. Clearly the event of which this symposium forms a
part-the bicentennial of the Constitution-is linked to the plea of
Washington in his Farewell Address that "the Constitution
be
sacredly maintained."' Washington, of course, was building on the
wish expressed by Madison in The FederalistNo. 49 that "veneration" rather than critique become the dominant motif of the citizen's relation to the Constitution, for only veneration would generate the stability requisite to maintaining even the "wisest and
'4
freest governments.

There is, of course, also a rich tradition of dissent from such
Constitution worship. Thus Jefferson could write acerbically in
1816 that "[s]ome men look at constitutions with sanctimonious
reverence and deem them like the ark of the covenant, too sacred
to be touched."5 Not for him a veneration that implied the suspension of disbelief about potential imperfections. After all, "institutions must advance also, and keep pace with the times. We might
as well require a man to wear still the coat which fitted him when a
boy, as civilized society to remain as under the regimen of their
barbarous ancestors." 6 An ever-changing and presumably progressing society should with some frequency check its wardrobe and
cast out that which no longer fits.
Still, the presence of conflicting traditions does not begin to resolve the question directed at us: How do we stand vis-&-vis the
Constitution? What is our demeanor as we come together in remembrance of its origins? Do we celebrate, affirm, renew the vows
of loyalty9 One can imagine, for example, two kinds of golden wedding anniversaries. One would feature a couple whose marriage is
3. Farewell Address by George Washington (Sept. 17, 1796), reprintedin 1
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS,

MESSAGES AND

1789-1897, at 214 (J. Richardson ed. 1896), quoted in M. KAM-

A MACHINE THAT WOULD Go OF ITSELF: THE CONSTITUTION IN AMERICAN CULTURE 70-71
(1986).
4. THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 314 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
5. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), reprinted in 10
THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 42 (P Ford ed. 1899), cited in Schneiderman v.
United States, 320 U.S. 118, 137 n.15 (1943).
6. Id.
MEN,
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universally recognized as truly fine and who might choose to ratify
that recognition, so to speak, by symbolically re-engaging in their
marriage ceremony of long ago to affirm the glory of their union.
The onlooking celebrants could indeed share in the sense of human
triumph over what Lincoln might call the "lesser angels" of our
nature,7 and tears of joy would be altogether appropriate as a response. Imagine, however, a second event, suffused with a kind of
bitter nostalgia, in which the motif is remembrance of the fond
hopes of fifty years ago coupled with a recognition that the marriage-though never formally dissolved by divorce-nonetheless in
no way lived up to those hopes or, even worse, its potential. Here,
renewal of the wedding vows would be rank sentimentality, the
known historical reality contradicting the claims of the words. The
only appropriate response of the participants in this sad spectacle
would be embarrassment. Bicentennials, like anniversaries, are
noncontingent events, dictated by the relentless turn of the calendar, but our responses to them are richly contingent and worth
examination.
One sometimes hears that the dominant theme of the bicentennial should be "cerebration" rather than "celebration." If this
means that we should engage in serious reflection rather than
mindless cheerleading, it is impossible to disagree. But this would
be equally true of wedding anniversaries. Indeed, the opposition
between analysis and, celebration is a false dichotomy, unless, that
is, one believes that all analysis is so filled with what Holmes called
"cynical acid" as to corrode the foundation necessary to genuine
celebration.
Is not the central question whether, after reflection, we can genuinely, with an open heart, do ourselves what we require of those
who would join the American polity from abroad by becoming naturalized citizens-that is, declare and celebrate our status as
Americans "attached to the principles of the Constitution" 9 8 If we
answer no, is it because some other conception of Americanness
offers us a better mode of political self-understanding, or is it that
7. A. LINCOLN, First InauguralAddress, in THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN
(R. Current ed. 1967). "The mystic chords of memory
will yet swell the chorus of the
Union, when again touched, as surely they will be, by the better angels of our nature." Id. at
179.
8. 8 U.S.C. § 1451(c) (1982). See tnfra note 65 and accompanying text.
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we view ourselves in the mode suggested some years ago by
Michael Walzer, as "alienated residents" 9 who have become the
functional equivalent of resident aliens, enjoying certain political
benefits of residence but without the strong feelings of felt membership in, and loyalty to, a specifically political order linked in a
meaningful way to the Constitution?
Raising these questions in an audience of law professors presents
a special paradox. One reaction I sometimes receive to my analysis
of the Constitution and civil religion is that only law professors,
and maybe a few lawyers, take the Constitution all that seriously
anyway Critics suggest that ordinary citizens are not involved with
the Constitution at any significant level, least of all as an item of
worship. Indeed, on the very morning that I wrote these remarks, I
heard a sociologist suggest on National Public Radio that the genuine civil religion of the American public is sports, particularly
events like the Superbowl.
Obviously we who are here today are far more interested in the
Constitution than the general populace. But that would obviously
be equally true in regard to the topic of any academic conference.
Do we in fact regard what we are teaching as of genuine import to
defining and maintaining a particular kind of presumably commendable American polity, or is our attitude a kind of clinical detachment? Is it even possible that our familiarity with the Constitution has served to breed not celebration but contempt? One
thinks of the oft-quoted comment that one should never observe
too closely a butcher shop or a legislature if one wants to continue
eating sausage or respecting statutes. Is the same true ultimately of
constitutional law9 Has our observation of the process of creation,
ranging from the runaway Convention in Philadelphia some two
hundred years ago to a long and bloody civil war, not to mention
the latest burst of incoherence from the Supreme Court, made us
incapable of celebrating the existence of the Constitution, and
therefore of engaging in the symbolic addition of our signature to
the document?
Perhaps you doubt the legitimacy of the analogy to the wedding
anniversary or to the overall framing question-ought we sign the
Constitution. After all, we rarely ask scholars whether they either
9. M.

WALZER,

Political Alienation and Military Service, in OBLIGATIONS 99, 114 (1970).
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endorse or repudiate that which they study One looks forward to
the tricentennial of the Glorious Revolution of 1688 or the bicentennial of the French Revolution without expecting overt testaments of belief on the part of the participants. Why should our
bicentennial be different?
One answer surely lies in the peculiarly ideological nature of the
very notion of American identity "For most peoples," writes Samuel P Huntington, "national identity is the product of a long
process of historical evolution involving common ancestors, common experiences, common ethnic background, common language,
common culture, and usually common religion."' 10 It is the fate of
the United States, however, to be different from "most peoples."
Here one's political identity is based not on shared Proustian remembrances, but rather on willed affirmation of what Huntington
refers to as the "American creed," a set of overt political commitments including, inter alia, an emphasis on individual rights, majority rule, and a constitutional order limiting governmental
power." American independence did not follow from any genuine
ethnic, linguistic, cultural, or religious difference from the British
center, but rather from the adoption of explicit political principles
set out in the Declaration of Independence. Americans were defined substantially as those who adhere to the truths enunciated in
the Declaration and later allegedly vindicated by the Constitution
adopted in Philadelphia. "What, then, does it mean to be an
American?"' 2 asks Whittle Johnson, echoing Hector St. John
Crevecoeur's more famous inquiry of two centuries ago, "What is
the American, this new man?"' For Johnson, who offered a strikingly similar analysis to the one later put forth by Huntington, the
answer is easy "To be an American means to be a member of the
'covenanting community' in which the commitment to freedom
under law, having transcended the 'natural' bonds of race, religion,
and class, itself takes on transcendent importance." 4

10. S. HUNTINGTON, AMERICAN POLITICS: THE PROMISE OF DISHARMONY 23 (1981).
11. Id. at 13-30.
12. Johnson, Little America-Big America, 58 YALE REV. 1, 11 (1968).

13. B. KETCHAM, FROM COLONY TO COUNTY: THE REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 17501820, at 173 (1974) (quoting J. CREVECOEUR, LETTERS TO AN AMERICAN FARMER (1782)).
14. Johnson, supra note 12, at 11.
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Thus Huntington is able to speak of "a body of political ideas
that constitutes 'Americanism' in a sense in which one can never
speak of 'Britishism,' 'Frenchism,' 'Germanism,' or Japanesism.'
Americanism in this sense is comparable to other ideologies or religions.' 1 5 It is this emphasis on creedal orthodoxy that, ironically
enough, has made possible the historically remarkable ethnic diversity of the United States and makes unremarkable the fact that

the child of an immigrant from Poland is speaking to you this
morning about the meaning of our national constitutional faith. As
Anne Norton has written, "Lacking that common ethnic history
which purportedly bound Americans to one another, the immigrants could establish commonalty with the natives only on principle.' 1 6 Norton's "only" is itself remarkably double-edged: if it
points to the limited nature of the American community, it also
captures the move toward universalistic criteria and the almost
unique openness to social strangers that are so much a part of
American history
A willingness by immigrants to endorse the principles of Americanism as incarnated in the Constitution became the benchmark of
citizenship. Indeed, as already noted, a predicate condition for becoming a naturalized citizen is the demonstration by applicants
that they are "attached to the principles of the Constitution of the
United States, 1

7

to be followed ultimately by a public oath ex-

pressing one's "support [for] the Constitution." 8 This ceremony of
community joinder aptly confirms Hans Kohn's description of the
Constitution as "unlike any other: it represents the lifeblood of the
American nation, its supreme symbol and manifestation. It is so
intimately welded with the national existence itself that the two
have become inseparable."' 9 Huntington adds his own gloss to
Kohn's comment as he argues that abrogating the Constitution is
identical with abrogating the nation itself, for it would "destroy
the basis of community, eliminating the nation and, in effect, re15. S. HUNTINGTON, supra note 10, at 25.
16. A. NORTON, ALTERNATIVE AMERICAS: A READING OF ANTEBELLUM POLITICAL CULTURE 74
(1986).
17. 8 U.S.C. § 1451(c) (1982). See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
18. Id. § 1448.
19. S. HUNTINGTON, supra note 10, at 30 (quoting H. KOHN, AMERICAN NATIONALISM: AN
INTERPRETIvE ESSAY 8 (1957)).
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turning its members-in accordance with the theory on which that
nation was founded-back to a state of nature."2 0 The United
States therefore should be recognized as a distinctive "faith community" organized in significant ways around the Constitution.
C.

The Constitutional Oath

Thomas Grey has pointed out a very important-though often
ignored-structural feature of the Constitution's mention of oaths
of office in article VI of the document.2 The third clause requires
that all political officials of the new country, both state and federal, "be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification
to any Office or public Trust under the United States."2 2 The repudiation of religious test oaths was a major break with the English
past; as Thomas Curry recently pointed out, it rejected distinctly
American temptations as well, given the propensity of some of the
states to adopt them.2 3 Indeed, it may well be that the source of
the clause is a defensive maneuver by religious groups afraid of
their position in the religious marketplace rather than a genuine
acceptance of the merit of religious toleration as such. Yet, as Grey
noted, the constitutional oath "is a ritual of allegiance, requiring
officers to affirm their primary loyalty"2' 4 to the value and commands contained within the document. He continues,
[T]he "but" suggests that the Framers considered the constitutional oath a substitute for the religious tests the colonists were
familiar with under the English established church. To push the
point a bit: America would have no national church
yet the
worship of the Constitution would serve the unifying function of
a national civil religion. 5
The constitutionally mandated "test oath" of fidelity to itself
provides a way of differentiating the American community from
what Karl Barth, analyzing a far more familiar European context,
20. Id.
21. Grey, The Constitution As Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV.
22. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
23. T. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS (1986).
24. Grey, supra note 21, at 18.
25. Id. (emphasis in original).

1

(1984).
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termed "the civil community," which "has no creed and no gospel."'2 6 To be sure, the creed and gospel are not "religious" m the

sense of enunciating a "common awareness of [the community's]
relationship to God,"'2 7 but a "creed" and a "gospel" the constitu-

tional epic most surely is. Irving Kristol has recently cited the
Constitution as part of the holy "trinity" of the American civil religion, along with the Declaration of Independence and the flag.28
And loyalty oaths, I have argued elsewhere," serve as the
equivalent of more traditional creedal affirmations, such as the
Apostles' Creed, that announce one as a subscriber to the central
tenets of a faith community
Robert Bellah pointed to an intimate link between republican
political vision and civil religion. "A republic as an active political
community of participating citizens must have a purpose and a set
of values." 30 It proclaims itself as an "ethical" community worthy
of "elicit[ing] the ethical commitment of its citizens." 31 There is
therefore a "symbolization of an ultimate order of existence in
which republican values and virtues make sense. Such symbolization may be nothing more than the worship of the republic itself as
the highest good,"3' 2 although Bellah argues that the American civil
religion includes "worship of a higher reality that upholds the
standards the republic attempts to embody ",33 1 am not concerned
here with assessing Bellah's last claim. It is enough for my purposes that the Constitution be recognized as the symbolization of
that which gives value to the American polity-by, as it were, defining the American way of life-and that we recognize as well our
historic use of an oath of fealty to its purported commands as a
way of creating the ethically republican citizen.

26. K. BARTH, The Christian Community and the Civil Community, in COMMUNITY,
STATE AND CHURCH 149, 151 (1960), quoted in Cover, Names and Narrative, 97 HARv. L.
REv. 4, 14 (1983).
27. Id.
28. See Kristol, The Spirit of '87, PUB. INTEREST, Winter 1987, at 3, 5.
29. For an expanded discussion of loyalty oaths, see Levinson, ConstitutingCommunities
Through Words That Bind: Reflections on Loyalty Oaths, 84 MhCH. L. REV. 1440 (1986).
30. Bellah, Religion and Legitimation of the American Republic, in VARIETIES OF CmL
RELIGION 3, 12 (1980).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 12-13.
33. Id. at 13.
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Whatever the legal authority to require such oaths, they have
proven, of course, to be controversial throughout our history Although I will not rehearse in full the arguments concerning the
propriety of requiring such oaths, 4 suffice it to say that opinion
about oaths is divided. The debate is perhaps best summed up by
Garry Wills in commenting on Abraham Lincoln's statement that
he was "exceedingly anxious that this Union, the Constitution, and
the liberties of the people shall be perpetuated in accordance with
the original idea for which the struggle was made."35 Wills notes
that this assertion is "inoffensive to most Americans-which explains why things like the House Un-American Activities Committee were inoffensive for so long."36 Indeed, Huntington also recognizes that one result of American creedalism has been a "preoccupation with 'un-American' political ideas and behavior. ' 37 The
problem, as Wills sees it,,is that "[i]f there is an American idea,
then one must subscribe to it in order to be an American."3 " Not
only must it be affirmed "on entry to the country,"39 but ways
must be found to make sure that native-born citizens also partake
of the requisite devotion."4 0 I thius recognize the possibility that
one plausible response to my question is anger and a principled
refusal to answer on the grounds that I have no right to put into
potential question your Americanness.
I am quite certain, though, that most of us here today have in
fact taken a loyalty oath at one time or another-indeed, perhaps
several times in our lives. If we are a member of a Bar, we have
surely pledged our fidelity not only to the United States Constitution, but to a state constitution as well. Those of us who teach at
state universities may very well have been asked to make the same
promise. Everyone who has applied for a passport has signed such
an oath. Indeed, from one perspective, my initial references to the
Philadelphia exhibition and to the title of my talk are both moot,
for all of us probably have at least indirectly pledged our support

34. See Levinson, supra note 29.
35. G. WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA xxii (1978).

36. Id.
37. S. HUNTINGTON, supra note 10, at 25.
38. G. WILLS, supra note 35, at xxii.

39. Id.
40. Id.

1987]

PLEDGING FAITH IN THE CIVIL RELIGION

of the Constitution by signing an oath that we support it. One way
of understanding what will follow is as a meditation on the devotion we have already manifested.
Still, ironically enough, I suspect that one consequence of the
coercive nature of the oaths we have signed is that many of us did
not reflect with any great seriousness on their meaning, other than,
perhaps, their signification of the presence of a too-powerful state.
Assuming that we noticed them at all, many of us probably treated
them roughly the same way my students at Texas respond to part
of a document they are required to submit to the Bar Association
as part of the process of becoming a lawyer. All applicants must
sign a statement indicating that they have read the Code of Professional Responsibility and have pledged their adherence to its demands. The overwhelming majority of my students indicated that
they had perjured themselves; they had not in fact read the Code,
and they treated the affirmation that they had as a mere formalism, not to be taken seriously. My students, who surely would take
umbrage at being called "nihilists," nonetheless treated the words
they signed as without genuine meaning. They surely provided no
guide either to what the signatories knew about the document in
question, for they had not read it, or regarding their likely conduct
as lawyers, for they had not reflected on what challenges to their
sense of self might be presented by taking on the role of the lawyer. How many of us who have taken loyalty oaths are any
different?
D.

Whether To Sign: A Significant Gesture

A decision accepting the invitation proferred by the Philadelphia
exhibit to sign the Constitution is, precisely because of its
noncoerciveness, perhaps a more significant gesture than the routinized submission to authority signified by the standard loyalty
oath. This is not to say that many visitors do not sign it without
reflection, but the gratuitous nature of the deed-to sign or not to
sign-invites a kind of reflection that the passport oath, for example, does not. From an ordinary utilitarian perspective, nothing
rides on our decision. We do not have to balance the desire to
travel abroad or the need for a job against the cost to our personal
pride or dignity of signing a notoriously vague set of words. To add
one's name to the Philadelphia scroll gets one nothing; to decline
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to do so loses nothing-from one perspective, that is. From another perspective, perhaps, the answer is that one gains or loses
everything; that is, one's true identity as a member-or rejector-of a peculiar American fellowship. Perhaps the analogy is to
the simple box marked "religion" that many us of confronted in
some document upon registering for college. It was precisely the
ability to mark "none" that made the decision to affirm membership in a particular community potentially significant, especially
insofar as that decision occurred at the moment of transformation
from the maximally encumbered status of child to the presumably
more fluid status of adult charged with shaping one's own identity
Now one possible response, which I assume some of you are considering at this very instant, is that this is all very silly The National Park Service, in setting up the scrolls, can be viewed as
merely offering a kind of "hands-on" experience to appease otherwise bored children being taken to the exhibit by dutiful parents
or, more likely, by a public school system trying to impose a rote
patriotism on its charges. One may well doubt that the Service intends to be raising profound questions of national identity for the
adults who wander in. Perhaps this description of origins is true,
but is it really so relevant?
If modern literary theory has taught us anything, it is the presence within texts of words, signs, symbols, or other devices that
undercut and subvert the "intended" message. The intended
meaning of the bicentennial may be to ratify the authority of the
Constitution; the invitation to sign, however, raises the possibility
of challenging its authority It is to bring the otherwise absent Jefferson, with his call for repeated constitutional conventions and his
skepticism about thoughtless veneration, into the Madisonian
presence. Surely it would be a devastating commentary on the
Constitution if most of the visitors made a reasoned decision not to
sign.
I am assuming that there is something meaningful-full of
meaning-in the encounter at the Second Bank. Whatever is going
on, I am asserting, it is not silly Imagine, for example, that one of
the visitors is Professor Salvemini, who wrote to Felix Frankfurter
of the great pride he felt in taking the oath of citizenship. He describes "allegiance to the Constitution" as a commitment "to an
ideal life. Thus, I took my oath with a joyous heart, and I am sure
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I will keep it with the whole of my heart as long as I am alive.""1
Would Salvemini be making a mistake if he added his signature
with pride and joy? Or, to put it perhaps more cogently, was his
statement to Frankfurter any less silly, or more admirable, than it
would be if delivered to his grandson, say, upon signing the scroll?
In any event, the designers of the Philadelphia exhibition have
made of us a deceptively simple request, to sign the Constitution
ourselves, and we must decide how to treat it. So please join me in
an imaginative trip to the Second Bank as we place ourselves in
front of the scrolls.

II.
A.

CHOOSING WHICH CONSTITUTION

To

ENDORSE

A Specific Document

The first thing we-that is, highly self-conscious- academics,
though I recognize the imperialist move in trying to evoke a community that itself is questionable-must decide, of course, is what
constitutes the Constitution we are being asked to sign. Are we being asked, for example, to endorse the specific document that was
adopted by the Convention on September 17 and ratified by the
states? Indeed, are we being asked to sign a "document" at all?
The Philadelphia exhibit is inevitably driven toward a "documentary" understanding of the Constitution, but surely the Constitution we teach often has a most tenuous relationship to the text.
After all, Paul Brest has spoken of contemporary constitutional
law as primarily "the elaboration of the Court's own precedents"
and has referred to the documentary Constitution of 178742as akin
to "a remote ancestor who came over on the Mayflower.
I argue elsewhere that emphasis on the Constitution as a "document" bespeaks a specifically "Protestant" notion of constitutionalism, which focuses on the presence of a foundational "scripture."
But there is also the possibility of an equally legitimate "Catholic"
or "Jewish" view that defines the Constitution, though including
the parchment ratified in 1788, as being constituted as well not
only by key decisions of the Supreme Court, Congress, and the
41. Levinson, supra note 29, at 1441 (citing FROM THE DiARiEs OF FELIX FRANKFURTER
211-12 (J. Lash ed. 1975)).
42. Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding,60 B.U.L. REv. 204,
234 (1980).
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President, but also by fundamental documents such as the Declaration of Independence and the Gettysburg Address and, beyond
that, aspects of the American experience that cannot be reduced to
a text at all. 4" No one on today's panel is identified with "originalism" as a preferred or even cogent method of constitutional interpretation, and it is therefore a fair question what the meaning of
signing any given document would be for us. I am willing to assume, however, in the remarks that follow, that it makes sense to
view the Constitution as a specific document. Still, even if we concede its documentary existence, the vital question remains: which
text captures the Constitution that we are being asked to, and that
we would in fact, sign?
B. A Constitution Without a Bill of Rights
Let us return, for example, to the centerpiece of the Philadelphia exhibit, the Constitution drafted in the Philadelphia summer
of 1787 Signing that document obviously raises a number of
problems. Do we want to sign a Constitution that does not include
a Bill of Rights? Historically, of course, the failure of the Convention to include a Bill of Rights did not doom their handiwork, but
certainly the conventional view is that ratification was purchased
only through a de facto agreement that the text would be so supplemented as soon as possible, as was in fact done.44
As we make the Bill of Rights more central to our concerns, do
we also make our signature contingent on our knowledge of the
way the story turned out in 17919 We may be signing not the text
presented to George Washington and his compatriots on September 17, but rather a text that was unavailable to them and one by
no means presumed to be likely or even desirable. We might recall,
for example, that several of the Philadelphia framers, including
Madison, Wilson, and Hamilton, specifically derided complaints
about the lack of a Bill of Rights, going so far as to suggest that
43. See S. LviOSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH, chapter 1 (forthcoming).
44. Consider the fact that we are meeting today in the Fourth Annual Bill of Rights Symposium, sponsored in part by the Institute of Bill of Rights Law. Perhaps the origins of the
Institute lie in a simple market calculation that the study of the Bill of Rights was an insufficiently occupied field. One suspects, however, that something more affirmative was intended by its formation and choice of name.
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the addition of a Bill of Rights would actually make the Constitution worse by suggesting that the national government in fact had
powers not specifically granted to it but which needed specific
limitation.45
The lack of a Bill of Rights was obviously no small matter.
George Mason, of course, was the most prominent member of the
Convention who refused to sign because of the lack of a bill of
rights. Was he wrong to have done so? Or, at the very least, was it
a reasonable decision, one that we ourselves can honor even if we
reject it and choose instead to give our maximum praise to those
46
who signed?
C. A Constitution That Legitimized Chattel Slavery
Much more serious, for some of us, is the brooding omnipresence
of American history-race and, more precisely, slavery Now one
can immediately try to evade the slavery issue in somewhat the
same way one evades the lack of a Bill of Rights in the 1787 Constitution. That is, just as one can in effect stipulate that the document one is signing is that supplemented by the 1791 amendments,
so can one announce that he or she is signing the post-1868 Constitution. But that is scarcely a satisfactory resolution to the context
of the Philadelphia exhibit or, for that matter, to the title of this
symposium, "1787" The Constitution in Perspective." For surely
we must decide what our stance-our perspective-is toward the
specific work of Madison, Wilson, the Morrises, and others.47
We can, of course, take a rigorously historicist approach and say
that it is absurd to try to place ourselves within the context of
45. G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 539-40 (1969).
46. Or can we honor Mason only because he was in fact unsuccessful m blocking ratification, so that the homage we pay him is a gracious gesture from the victor to the vanquished
rather than a genuine recognition of what Dworkin might call "equal respect?" See Dworkin, Liberalism, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE-MORALITY 113, 127-28 (S. Hampshire ed. 1978). Consider how we might react upon meeting the man our mother rejected m favor of our father.
We might indeed view him as a fine person, maybe even better in some ways than the victor
in the competition, but could we genuinely achieve an olympian indifference to the outcome,
given its bearing on our own existence?
47. This may falsely suggest, incidentally, that there is only one perspective, whereas the
problem is obviously a multiplicity of perspectives, not only among ourselves but even
within the fabric of our thought. As with certain paintings, by Monet, for example, what one
sees is entirely contingent on where one decides to stand.
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1787 and decide whether we would have endorsed the Constitution
then or, indeed, whether we now applaud the specific outcome of
that year. I am sympathetic to that argument, given that I do not
believe we can shed our historically located skin and engage in a
mental equivalent of completely successful time travel. We can engage the past, to be sure, but we cannot rejoin the past. The historicist strategy has one fundamental problem, however. Designed,
among other things, to save the Constitution-and its framers-from censure, the historicist strategy also has the effect of
displacing the Constitution as an object of esteem. For if we distance ourselves from 1787 by treating it as an essentially "lost
world," to adopt Daniel Boorstin's title of his brilliant book on
Thomas Jefferson,4s then it makes little more sense to select out
what we like for praise than to focus on what we object to for
censure.
But is not the bicentennial predicated on the notion that we are
celebrating something that is recognizable as a continuing part of
our own lives and political culture? Pole once referred to a "peculiarly American version of the space-time continuum" 49 which
blithely ignored the possibility that the past had become irrelevant, that it was truly a temps perdu-a lost time. "[W]hat one
misses is that sense, inescapable in Europe, of the total, crumbled
irrecoverability of the past, of its differentness, of the fact that it is
dead. '50 We, on the other hand, often refer with pride to ours be-

ing a "living Constitution," and not even Chief Justice Rehnquist
is willing to endorse a "dead Constitution,

'5 1

however great his

qualms about those who promote a perhaps too lively Constitution.
Does not the same predication of endurance through many generations, uniting the living, the dead, and the yet unborn, undergird in substantial ways the presentation of the standard constitutional law course, in which we often view ourselves as linked in
discourse with John Marshall, and perhaps even Madison? That
enterprise makes sense only if we deny the presence of radical paradigm shifts that, by definition, make almost impossible genuine
48. See D. BOORSTIN, THE LOST WORLD OP THOMAS JEFFERSON (1948).
49. Pole, The American Past: Is It Still Usable?, 1 J. Am.STUD. 63, 63 (1967).

50. Id.
51. See Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEx. L. REV. 693 (1976).
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conversation between those under the sway of different paradigms.
I suspect that most of us here today are considerably more historicist than the previous sentences allow, though I wonder how much
we have integrated that into our teaching.
So let us return to what is surely one of the most difficult
problems presented those who would celebrate the Constitution-chattel slavery An ever-present temptation revealed, among
other places, in the contents of most casebooks on constitutional
law is basically to ignore chattel slavery as a constitutionally legitimized presence in American history To put it mildly, that does
not seem to be a satisfactory solution, any more than is the
mindless celebration of Western humanism or Christian sensibility
which ignores the Holocaust's arising m a land of unusully high
culture and piety
What, for example, should we expect the black visitor to Philadelphia to do when invited to sign the Constitution? Many of us
remember well Barbara Jordan's impassioned pronouncement, just
before she cast her vote to impeach Richard Nixon, that "[m]y
faith in the Constitution is whole, it is complete, it is total, and I
am not going to sit here and be an idle spectator to the diminution,
the subversion of the Constitution."52 Could she possibly have
made the same speech in regard to the Constitution of 200 years
ago 9 Might she not have joined William Lloyd Garrison in describ'5 3
ing it as a "covenant with death and an agreement with hell,
with its subversion therefore becoming the heartfelt duty of a
moral being9 I am not primarily interested, however, in discussing
the absent Barbara Jordan; instead, I want to know how we-the
persons gathered here today, including the distinguished commentators on my paper-handle the Constitution's relation to slavery
I suppose that one option open to us-and especially to those of
us identified with what are perceived to be free-wheeling ap52. B. JORDAN & S. HEARON, BARBARA JORDAN, A SELF-PORTRAIT 187 (1979).
53. This phrase, taken from the book of Isaiah, appeared in a resolution that Garrison
introduced at a meeting of the Massachusetts Anti-Slavery Society n January 1843: "That
the compact which exists between the North and the South is 'a covenant with death, and
an agreement with hell'-involving both parties in atrocious criminality; and should be immediately annulled." W. MERRILL, AGAINST WIND AND TIDE: A BIOGRAPHY OF WM. LLOYD
GARRISON 205 (1963). See also Address by Justice Thurgood Marshall, San Francisco Patent
and Trademark Law Association Annual Seminar (May 6, 1987).
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proaches to constitutional interpretation-is the adoption of an argument like that which Frederick Douglass made in 1860, when he
labeled the Constitution, correctly understood, as in fact antislavery "I undertake to say," stated Douglass, "that the constitutionality of slavery can be made out only by disregarding the plain and
common-sense reading of the Constitution itself.
[T]he Constitution will afford slavery no protection when it shall cease to be
administered by slaveholders. 54 And, of course, nearer to our own
time, Ronald Dworkin has made a somewhat similar argument. 55
Douglass's central move, of course, was a radical one: to split off
the Constitution from decisions of the Supreme Court, which he
recognized as recurrently protective of slavery I personally have
no problem with this, although the recent response to a similar
move by Attorney General Meese certainly indicates a great deal of
disquiet with such arguments. In any case, acceptance of
Douglass's view of the Constitution presumably allows an opponent of slavery to sign even the 1787 Constitution with a clear
heart, the only price being the necessity to embrace some especially controversial theories of constitutional interpretation.
Assume, however, that the potential signer-perhaps you yourself-is unwilling to pay that price or, at the very least, is unable
to agree with Douglass's reading of the Constitution and accepts
instead the more standard reading of the document as significantly
protective of slaveholder interests. What follows 9 One might, for
example, adopt Justice Story's view that abominations like the Fugitive Slave Clause, not to mention the guaranteed protection of
the international slave trade for twenty years and the added representation given to the South because of its slaves, were necessary
in order to form the Union. 6 At this point the inquiry could
branch off into at least two directions. The first assumes the desirability of union and then asks whether in fact achievement of that
end required the means chosen in Philadelphia and therefore our

54. F DOUGLASS, The Constitution of the United States: Is It Pro-Slavery or Anti-Slav-

ery?, in 2 THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 477, 478 (P Foner ed. 1950).
55. Dworkin, The Law of the Slave-Catchers (Book Review), The Times (London), Dec.
5, 1975 (Literary Supplement), at 1437. Dworkin states, "The general structure of the American Constitution presupposed a conception of individual freedom antagonistic to slavery."
Id. at col. 5.
56. See Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 536, 611 (1842).
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retrospective, albeit reluctant, ratification. To ask the question this
way, of course, inevitably gives greatest weight to the historical
record as it actually developed and to the justifications offered at
the time, for it indeed seems tendentious to deny the efficacy of
the compromises offered to attaining the goal of creating a
strengthened United States. We may, however, ask a second question: Do we in fact share the commitment to union that justifies
the compromises?
Once again, one might quickly ask whether we can really ask
such questions in a meaningful way Can we genuinely imagine an
alternative history for the last 200 years which would allow us to
answer the question as asked? Indeed, as someone like Michael
Sandel would remind us, isn't the very self that grapples with the
question so much the product of the existence of the union that we
are ultimately asking if we would wish to be radically different
selves? 57 I acknowledge this possibility only to bracket it.
D A Constitution That Provides a Republican Form of
Government
We know that many opposed ratification of the Constitution because of their fear of the centralized Union they saw implied by
the document, and presumably it remains open to us to declare our
sympathy with or opposition to some of these Antifederalists even
though they were defeated. Few Antifederalists, of course, focused
on the collaboration with slavery as the source of their discontent.58 Much more important for most of them was the fear that
popular participation in governance would become attenuated and
that government would increasingly be placed in the hands of the
elite. The most important response to this argument, of course, is
contained in The Federalist No. 14, in which Madison delivered
his crucial attack on the assumption that republican government
can be maintained only in a relatively small territory 59 Even if we
think that Madison was right within his particular context-a

57. See M.

SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE

(1982).

58. To their credit, some Antifederalists, such as Luther Martin in Maryland, opposed
the Constitution at least in part because of its provisions in support of slavery. P CLARKSON
& R.S. JETT, LUTHER MARTIN OF MARYLAND 127-28 (1970).
59. See THE FEDERALIST No. 14 (J. Madison).
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country of approximately three million people in thirteen
states-one may doubt that his arguments apply quite so neatly to
the country that ultimately developed and within which we live. It
is hard to gainsay the feelings of utter marginalization and meanmglessness of participation within the present political order. Calls
by Professor Sunstein and others for the revival of republican political sensibility,6 0 however attractive to some of us, will remain
implausible as prescriptions for a polity of such different size and
scope as that which we have become.
This being said, it is hard to believe that a "balkanized" United
States would necessarily have developed in any more participatory
a fashion than the constitutional union. Our history has no plausible counter-rendering that would leave us with a small enough-or
egalitarian enough-population to make generalized active citizenship a norm. Moreover, one must also ask about the costs imposed
by actively attempting to maintain a small, homogeneous social order conducive to such citizenship. Many of us benefitted from generous immigration policies that might well not have survived a
stronger emphasis on preserving a republican political order.
Still, one might well turn this argument around and maintain
that a more balkanized political order divided along northern and
southern lines nonetheless would have remained equally hospitable
to immigration while not forcing the collaboration with slavery
found in the Constitution, if those are indeed one's central concerns. There is no good reason to believe that the northern states,
whose economies generated pro-immigrant policies, would have behaved any differently had they not been joined with the southern
states, which were historically more skeptical about open immigration. The problem, of course, is that we move into the realm of
more and more counterfactual history that sends the imagination
reeling. Assuming that Napoleon would still have been willing to
sell the Louisiana territories, to whom would he have sold them,
and so on?
And, of course, the central problem with "disunionist" thinking,
as pointed out by some of Garrison's own opponents, 61 is that it

60. See Sunsteln, Interest Groups tn American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1986).
61. See, e.g., A. KRADITOR, MEANS AND ENDS IN AMERICAN ABOLITIONISM: GARRISON AND
HIS CRITICS ON STRATEGY AND TACTICS, 1834-1850, at 178-224 (1969).
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focused more on the immorality of collaboration with slavery than
on the question of how one most quickly could bring slavery to an
end. We know that with ratification of the thirteenth amendment,
chattel slavery ended by 1865. Is there good reason to believe that
it would have ended earlier if the Constitution had not been ratified and balkanization had followed instead? I suspect not. But the
important point is surely this: Can one who believes that the ratification of the Constitution did enhance the prospects and the actuality of chattel slavery still sign the Constitution? What precisely
is the value of the Constitution and of the concomitant nation that
would justify even an extra week's slavery? What precisely is the
omelet that justified breaking those particular eggs?
E. The "Second" Constitutin
As I have already suggested, one mighttry to finesse these difficult, if not excruciating, questions by focusing on what some have
called the "second" Constitution; that is, the post Civil War document distinguished by the addition of the thirteenth, fourteenth
and fifteenth amendments. That allows a solution to the chattel
slavery problem, though not necessarily other kinds of slavery such
as wage slavery, and it might justify the decision of many blacks to
add their signatures to the reformed document. But could Barbara
Jordan necessarily sign even the 1868 Constitution? After all, the
standard reading of that Constitution is that it did not guarantee
women the right to vote. Women were not given this most basic
attribute of community membership until 1920 and the nineteenth
amendment. Some partisans of the Equal Rights Amendment
would deny that women have been granted full rights of membership even today Now, one might argue that the fourteenth amendment, correctly read, "in fact" invalidated allocation of the ballot
by gender. I assume that most of us today would agree, although at
the very least this makes problematic the existence of the nineteenth amendment and raises many important issues of constitutional interpretation.
But what of today's Constitution? Is it sufficiently "perfect" that
signing is not problematic? For example, what might persons
mired in poverty have to say to a Constitution that is seemingly
indifferent, at least under the "orthodox" views articulated by the
Court and taught in most law school classrooms, to their plight?
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Protection of "negative" liberties are precious, but that does not
make any less pressing the need for "affirmative" access to food,
shelter, medical care, education, and the like. Should we expect the
homeless victims of a literally careless political economy to sign
the Constitution?
Even the well-off need hardly believe that the Constitution is
sufficiently perfect to merit their unequivocal endorsement. I assume that no one need believe that it is truly perfect in order to
sign; the question is what deviation from perfection is tolerable,
justifying inevitable compromises. Consider, in this context, the recent report by Lloyd Cutler and other distinguished citizens suggesting that the vaunted system of separation of powers and
checks and balances is in fact a recipe for immobilism and a government incapacitated from effective action or, what is worse, a
government tempted to achieve "effectiveness" by the surreptitious practices carried to new heights-or depths-by the current
administration. 2 The answer, according to these analyses, lies in
such practices as tightening the connection between presidential
and congressional elections, allowing members of Congress to serve
in the Cabinet, and, most radical of all, allowing the calling of new
elections should President and Congress be hopelessly deadlocked.
Perhaps one way of testing whether these truly would be "fundamental" changes in our constitutional system would be by asking
whether a person who shares the premises of this analysis will sign
the Constitution. An affirmative answer could well have two aspects. First, even with the defects of the present system of governance, it is still sufficiently protective of liberty and helpful to
achieving justice that it deserves our support. Second, one could
emphasize as key to the Constitution the existence of article V, the
amending clause.63 Article V is the best possible evidence for the
proposition that the framers themselves did not believe that they
had created a perfect document and that future changes were completely legitimate, at least so long as the changes arose through
article V procedures.
Article V can become the great source of consensus-

62. See Committee on the Constitutional System, A Bicentennial Analysis of the American Political Structure (Sept. 1986) (draft) (unpublished manuscript).
63. U.S. CONST. art. V
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paradoxically, insofar as it appears to legitimize radical dissents.
That is, so long as we do not believe that the Constitution is absolutely terrible, then presumably we can sign it by saying that we
will strive to bring it more in line with our favorite vision of the
polity through an article V amendment. But this emphasis on article V itself raises some profound problems.

III.

ATTACHMENT TO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CONSTITUTION:
SCHNEIDERMAN

V

UNITED STATES

Does article V stand for the proposition that any set of values or
political beliefs is congruent with fidelity to the Constitution, so
long as one is willing to endorse article V procedures as the mode
of bringing them about? Or, on the contrary, can we expect our
fellow signatories, should we decide to sign ourselves, to share with
us certain basic commitments beyond the pleasure in potential
transvaluation seemingly legitimized by the existence of article V9
A.

Attachment

Imagine, for example, someone who believes that the Constitution is acceptable as it stands, though it would be even better with
the renewal of chattel slavery, the institution of a state church, or
whatever. Is there any bar to that person signing the Constitution
while muttering what we might call the "article V proviso"'9 At
least limited insight into the problem being discussed is presented
64
by a marvelous 1943 case, Schneiderman v. United States.
In that case the Justice Department tried to strip William
Schneiderman of his American citizenship on the grounds that he
had not been in compliance with the law when, in 1927, he had
become a naturalized citizen. At that time he was, and remained,
an active member of the Workers (Communist) Party of America.
The Department argued that the commitments taken on by
Schneiderman as a loyal communist made it impossible for him to
have genuinely complied with the statutory requirement that an
applicant for citizenship certify that he or she had behaved as a
person "attached to the principles of the Constitution of the

64. 320 U.S. 118 (1943).
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United States."6 5 The case thus centrally concerned what counts as
such behavior and, ultimately, the status of being "attached" to
the Constitution.
Without rehearsing the complex set of dilemmas presented by
Schneiderman's case, suffice it to say that the government described Schneiderman's projected changes in the structure of
American governance as so "sweeping
that he simply could
not be attached to it." ' 66 In addition, as one might expect, the Justice Department alleged that Schneiderman "believed in and advocated the overthrow by force and violence of the Government,
Constitution, and laws of the United States.""
The Government never denied that an alien or, obviously, a native-born citizen could consistently be attached to the Constitution
even while believing "that the laws and the Constitution should be
amended in some or many respects."6 8 It did argue, however, that
"an alien must believe in and sincerely adhere to the 'general political philosophy' of the Constitution."6 9 One might have paraphrased Lincoln at this point by emphasizing the "propositions" to
which America, and the Constitution, is dedicated and which members of the faith community are expected to affirm. The Justice
Department offered the following specifications of what might be
termed constitutional propositionalism:
The test is
whether [the applicant] substitutes revolution
for evolution, destruction for construction, whether he believes
in an ordered society, a government of laws, under which the
powers of government are granted by the people but under a
grant which itself preserves to the individual and to minorities
certain rights or freedoms which even the majority may not take
away; whether, in sum, the events which began at least no further back than the Declaration of Independence, followed by the
Revolutionary War and the adoption of the Constitution, establish principles with respect to government, the individual, the

65. Id. at 121 n.2.

66. Id. at 135.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 140.
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minority and the majority, by which ordered liberty is replaced
by disorganized liberty.70
The majority of the Court refused to accept as dispositive the
statements of "certain alleged Party principles and statements by
Party Leaders which are said to be fundamentally at variance with
the principles of the Constitution."' 71 Instead, it emphasized "that
under our traditions beliefs are personal and not a matter of mere
association, and that men in adhering to a political party or other
organization notoriously do not subscribe unqualifiedly to all of its
platforms or asserted principles. '72 Nonetheless, the majority did
examine some aspects of the platform of the Communist Party,
which included calls for the abolition of private property without
compensation, the establishment of a proletarian dictatorship with
political rights to be denied to persons who were not proletarian
and/or members of the Party, and the creation of an international
union of soviet republics. Justice Murphy denied that these goals
necessarily implied nonattachment to the Constitution. Although
the court below had stated that the views of the Communist Party
"are not those of our Constitution, 73 Justice Murphy and the majority in effect disagreed.
Although noting that the fifth amendment prohibits the taking
of private property without compensation, the Court observed that
throughout our history many sincere people whose attachment

to the general constitutional scheme cannot be doubted have, for
various and even divergent reasons, urged differing degrees of
government ownership and control of natural resources, basic
means of production, and banks and the media of exchange, either with or without compensation.74
The Court went on to point out that "something once regarded as
a species of private property was abolished without compensating
'75 Justhe owners when the institution of slavery was forbidden.

70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
1941)).
74. Id.
75. Id.

at 140 n.20 (quoting Brief for United States at 105).
at 136.
at 141 (quoting Schneiderman v. United States, 199 F.2d 500 at 504 (9th Cir.
at 141.
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tice Murphy then went on to ask, thinking that he was asking an
entirely rhetorical question, if "the author of the Emancipation
Proclamation and the supporters of the Thirteenth Amendment
'76
were not attached to the Constitution.
Justice Murphy continued his remarkable march through the
program of the Communist Party and his indication of its potential congruence to attachment to the Constitution. Thus support of
the dictatorship of the proletariat is "constitutionalized," as it
were, by noting the "fluid" nature of the concept and the "meager
indications of the form the 'dictatorship' would take in this country "277 In particular, he stated that its adoption need not necessarily bring "the end of the representative government or the federal
system. '78 It is true that the Party criticized checks and balances,
the Senate's legislative role, and "the involved procedure for
amending the Constitution," all of which were characterized "as
devices designed to frustrate the will of the majority ,,79 Indeed,
Justice Murphy even took note of the 1928 platform of the Party,
although it was written after Schneiderman's naturalization. There
the Party "advocated the abolition of the Senate, of the Supreme
Court, and of the veto power of the President," as well as "replacement of congressional districts with 'councils of workers' in which
legislative and executive power would be united."8 0
These would, to be sure, be "significant changes" in the American government; however, "whatever our personal views, as judges
we cannot say that a person who advocates their adoption through
peaceful and constitutional means is not in fact attached to the
Constitution." 81 Justice Murphy noted that umcameralism had
been adopted by one of the American states, Nebraska, and thus
presumably did not violate the "republican form of government" '
sanctified by article IV of the Constitution. 3 As for the Supreme

76. Id.
77. Id. at 142.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 142-43.
80. Id. at 143.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 143 n.24.
83. In terms of pure theory, abolition of the Senate through ordinary constitutional
amendment does not violate the unanimity requirement of article V regarding equality of
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Court, Murphy noted that criticism of its role was endemic in

American politics. He cited Theodore Roosevelt, "whose sincerity
and attachment to the Constitution is [sic] beyond question,"84 as
supporting the popular recall of judicial decisions with its attendant radical transformation of the Court's role in our constitutional
system.
Turning from structure to substantive rights, the majority
stated, "[I]f any provisions of the Constitution can be singled out
as requiring unqualified attachment, they are the guaranties of the
Bill of Rights and especially that of freedom of thought contained
in the First Amendment. '85 The Court specifically declined, however, to reach the question of Schneiderman's possible repudiation
of those principles by supporting the denial of political and civil
rights to nonproletarians or non-Party members, "for on the basis
of the record before us it has not been clearly shown that such
denial was a principle of the organizations" within which Schneiderman was active. 6 Lenin, for example, has been cited both in behalf of suppressing class enemies and for the possibility of achieving revolution while maintaining certain liberties for the
bourgeoisie. 87 It would have been illegitimate, therefore, to attribute to Schneiderman views that could not even confidently be assigned to those organizations.
B. The Article V Proviso
The central motif of the majority opinion, though, is surely the
multitide of political arrangements and substantive values congruent with "attachment" to the Constitution. "The constitutional fathers, fresh from a revolution, did not forge a political strait-jacket
for the generations to come."8 8 It is at this point in the opinion
that the majority gives center stage to article V of the Constitution, which "contains procedural provisions for constitutional
change by amendment without any present limitation whatsoever
Senate membership. Each state would in fact retain an equal role in the Senate-none at
all-following its abolition.
84. 320 U.S. at 144.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 145.
88. Id. at 137.
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except that no State may be deprived of equal representation in
the Senate without its consent."89 Article V, coupled with the reality of "the many important and far-reaching changes made in the
Constitution since 1787," according to the majority, "refute[s] the
idea that attachment to any particular provision or provisions is
essential, or that one who advocates radical changes is necessarily
not attached to the Constitution."90

Murphy's latitudinarianism was ultimately derived from a joinder of the ostensibly almost open-ended article V with a particular
reading of the first amendment, that of Justice Holmes. 91 For, as
just indicated, it is "the principle of free thought" that most "imperatively calls for attachment." 2 Murphy adopted the Holmesian
reading of the first amendment as extending toleration even to
"the thought that we hate. 91 3 Note well, however, that this princi-

ple easily can be reformulated as guaranteeing toleration even to
those who clearly reject the Constitution and are by no plausible
interpretation attached to it. The person who forthrightly refuses
to sign the Constitution because she repudiates it in full, whatever
that might mean, thus is quite properly protected from sanction. It
seems thoroughly pickwickian, however, to state that such repudiation could count as the signification of attachment. But is it not
equally pickwickian should she sign it while stating the article V
proviso; that is, that she rejects everything except article V, which
allows her to support anything9
Schneiderman's lawyer, the defeated 1940 Republican presidential candidate Wendell Wilkie, argued, as described by the Court,
that the absence of limitations in article V meant that "a person
can be attached to the Constitution no matter how extensive the
changes are that he desires, so long as he seeks to achieve his ends
within the framework of Article V "" The Court specifically declined to adopt this "extreme position," finding instead that the
Government had failed to meet its burden of proof even under its
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 138.
92. Id. at 138 (citing United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654-55 (1929) (Holmes,
J., dissenting)).
93. Id. at 138.
94. Id. at 140.
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own, less generous test.95 But would we accord such legitimacy to
the article V argument? It isworth noting, incidentally, in light of
Bruce Ackerman's recent writing on the background of the Civil
War Amendments, that the limits imposed by having to remain
"within the framework of Article V" 96 may themselves be less clear
than one would at first imagine. Ackerman quite specifically denies
that the article sets out the exclusive process of amendment, and
he goes on to argue that the peculiar process by which the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments in particular were added to the
97
Constitution serves as an equally legitimate constitutive act.
The symposium format does not allow time for me to go through
Chief Justice Stone's impassioned dissent, which Justices Frankfurter and Roberts joined. Suffice it to say that Chief Justice Stone
viewed the Constitution as incarnating "principles," including "the
freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights," which would be
"ended" if the program of the Communist Party were implemented. 8 It was therefore altogether legitimate to infer nonattachment to those principles from Schneiderman's active membership
in the Party at the time of his naturalization.
If one views Schneiderman as a proto first amendment case and
places it within the context of the anti-Communist cases that
would shortly thereafter lead to a series of dreadful decisions by a
frightened Supreme Court, then it is hard not to applaud Justice
Murphy's opinion. Still, I confess to finding Schneiderman a much
harder case than Dennis v. United States and its progeny, 99 precisely because the earlier case deals at a formal level not with what
kind of speech or conduct can be punished, but rather with what
we deem ourselves to be as an American community purportedly
organized around a common attachment to constitutional principles. Schneiderman tends to remove any real "bite" from a decision to affirm one's attachment, or to add one's signature. The

95. Id. See supra text accompanying note 72.
96. See Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013
(1984).
97. Id. at 1057-70.
98. 320 U.S. at 193-94.
99. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). See Scales v. United States, 367 U.S.
203 (1961); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
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Constitution ends up seeming trivialized by the end of the opinion,
even as the cause of civil liberties probably has been vindicated.
IV

CONCLUSION

I hope that I have sufficiently justified my title and the value of
the question it asks. I also recognize, though, that I have been engaging in a process of repeated deferral, indicating the various
ramifications of the question without indicating my own answers.
It is time to cease the evasion, especially if I wish to draw out answers from all of you. I shall be in Philadelphia on May 25, which,
not entirely by coincidence, is the 200th anniversary of the opening
of the Convention. It will be easy enough to stop by the Second
Bank once more. Will I add my signature to the scroll this time9
I can honestly say that I did not know what the answer would be
when I began thinking about this paper, or even when I began
writing it. No doubt there was a temptation to say no, whether to
indicate a symbolic solidarity with the victims of the American
Constitution-including but not limited to slaves-or simply to
manifest a certain kind of iconoclasm. That opinion, however, just
doesn't write, at least for me, though I do regard it as a genuine
possibility for others.
The Constitution is a linguistic system, what some among us
might call a discourse. It has helped to generate a uniquely American form of political rhetoric that allows one to grapple with every
important political issue imaginable. As Jeff Powell has written, it
provides "a common language with which to carry on debate about
the distribution and use of power in our society "100 The fact that
its teachings are, according to some of us, indeterminate, is quite
beside the point, for so is any system of language. There is little
meaningful "determinacy" to English; it allows the formulation of
a literally infinite number of sentences, many of which can be in
logical contradiction with one another. But they all count as recognizable sentences of our language, which forms us just as much as
we purport to form it. If the orthodox language of the Constitution
promotes a stingy, "negative"-rights oriented view of the polity,
there are alternate sentences available, as Mark Tushnet has em100. H.J. Powell, What the ConstitutionMeans for Your Town, and for You, Des Moines
Register, Dec. 18, 1986, at 13a.
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phasized, that can promote a socialist vision.10 1 The key point is
that one need not learn a "new language" in order to promote
one's favored vision of the polity.
Obviously one can learn new languages, just as it is helpful to try
to become less parochial about the so-called American way of doing things, but it is a radical step indeed when a person consciously
repudiates an old language, and the renunciation and abjuration of
that language almost always are accompanied by special circumstances. I have been told that there are some Afrikaaner writers
who have chosen to stop writing in that language as a sign of their
revulsion against the terrible culture linked with it; presumably,
some writers did the same with German some fifty years ago. For a
writer, no more magnificent, or terrible, gesture can be imagined.
In preparing these remarks, I have come to realize my refusal to
sign the Constitution would require a much deeper alienation from
American life and politics than I can genuinely feel, or, indeed,
have ever felt. The Constitution-or perhaps what we might term
"Constitution-talk"-has in some of its manifestations incarnated
what is worst about the United States; but, of course, it captures as
well what is best about this country I recognize, of course, that as
a definitely privileged member of the American class structure, I
may be more genuinely aware of the benefits over the burdens or,
more ominously, may be unaware of the extent to which my benefits are structurally dependent on what I purport to find less attractive. Still, the fact remains that I believe that constitutionalist
discourse can be a valuable way of addressing crucial public issues,
and I am not sure that any competing rhetoric is likely to prove
more productive, not to mention all the costs attached to learning
the new language of any such rhetoric.
Whatever its problems, Schneiderman is altogether accurate in
evoking a sense of the fluidity of the Constitution, its resistance to
any kind of fixity or closure, even though some would seek it either
in the text or in the pronouncements of an authoritative institution like the Supreme Court. For me, signing the Constitution
commits one not to closure but only to a process of becoming, and
to taking responsibility for constructing the political vision toward

101. See, e.g., Tushnet, Does Constitutional Theory Matter?: A Comment, 65 TEx. L.
REv. 777, 782-86 (1987).
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which I, joined, I hope, with others, strive. It is less a series of
propositional utterances-for I, at least, have proved singularly unsuccessful in reducing the Constitution to some essentialist distillation-than a commitment to taking political conversation seriously I would want to distinguish this from an entirely "article V"
view of the Constitution, however, because I do indeed believe that
the Constitution is best understood as supportive of such conversations and of government predicated on respect for their
maintenance.
There is, undoubtedly, little that is surprising in this conclusion.
"Well-off law professor supports Constitution" is scarcely a headline likely to sell newspapers. Nor have I been able to achieve a
self-satisfying elegance explaining this unsurprising development.
Every text has a subtext, and perhaps the subtext of this talk is
not so much the question, would you sign the Constitution, as a
paraphrased version of the title of a Raymond Carver collection of
stories on modern life and love, "How do we talk when we talk
about law?" The answer, at the end of the twentieth century, is
haltingly, ineloquently, with silences that become independent
parts of the conversation. But even some of the refugees from
Carver-land find themselves enunciating wedding vows with
whatever self-conscious irony, and so am I willing to add my signature to the Constitution, secure mainly in the belief that a refusal
to do so would be not only a far more hostile gesture than I am
capable of, but also a yet further step toward the end of conversation itself, what Clifford Geertz has recently described as a life
"marooned in a Beckett-world of colliding soliloquy "'o2 I take it
that most of us prefer to believe that some kind of dialogue remains more or less possible, the question being, of course, whether
we can find a common language in which to speak and ask our
questions.
In any event, I have tried to sketch out what constitutes my
Constitution, and why I am willing to sign it and even to celebrate
its presence in our culture. What is your Constitution, and are you
willing to sign it?

102. C. Geertz, The Uses of Diversity 271 (Nov. 8, 1985) (the Tanner Lectures on Human
Values delivered at the University of Michigan).

